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“I PLEAD THE FIFTH”: NEW YORK’S INTEGRATED 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURTS AND THE DEFENDANT’S 
FIFTH AMENDMENT DILEMMA 
Rhona Mae Amorado* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Domestic violence is a problem that continues to baffle socie-
ty today.  In June 1994, the nation came face-to-face with the horrify-
ing truth about domestic violence when news of the brutal murder of 
Nicole Brown Simpson and subsequent arrest of football legend, 
Orenthal James (O.J.) Simpson, surfaced.1  Incidents of domestic vio-
lence have recurrently appeared in national news headlines since 
then.2  Two decades later, the media was filled with news of the arrest 
of then-National Football League player, Ray Rice, pertaining to a 
domestic assault caught on camera.3  The effects of this unfortunate 
incident rippled wide and, once again, society was forced to face the 
uncomfortable topic of domestic violence.4  On February 2, 2016, an 
 
* J.D. Candidate 2018, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; M.S.W. Candidate 
2018, Stony Brook University, School of Social Welfare; M.A. Forensic Psychology, John 
Jay College of Criminal Justice; B.A. Psychology and B.S.E. Religious Education, De La 
Salle University, Philippines.  I would like to thank Dean Myra Berman for suggesting this 
topic, connecting me to various resources and guiding me throughout this whole process.  
Thank you to all the professionals who have given me a wealth of information.  I would like 
to particularly thank Judge Andrew A. Crecca, Presiding Judge of the Integrated Domestic 
Violence Court, Suffolk County, for allowing me to interview him regarding IDV courts, as 
well as the VIBS HALT Program clinical staff, who has taught me so much about domestic 
violence and working with batterers.  I further would like to thank Kristen Curley for her 
advice, guidance, and patience during my editing process.  Most importantly, I would like to 
thank my family and my partner for their love, support, and encouragement. 
1 Eric Malnic & David Ferrell, O.J. Simpson’s Ex-Wife Found Stabbed to Death, LOS 
ANGELES TIMES (June 14, 1994), http://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-oj-simpsons-exwife-
found-stabbed-to-death-story.html. 
2 See generally DAWN BRADLEY BERRY, THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SOURCEBOOK (3d ed. 
2000) [hereinafter BERRY]. 
3 Childs Walker, One Year After Ray Rice Incident, Impacts Abound for Ravens, NFL, 
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estimated 5.11 million viewers tuned in to watch the first installment 
of television network FX’s American Crime Story, The People v. O.J. 
Simpson.5  Entertainment and news articles released a few days after 
the show’s premiere suggest the continued significance and impact of 
the O.J. murder trial and subsequent civil trial on issues about race, 
gender, and more importantly, domestic violence.6 
Domestic violence is not only a problem for celebrities or 
public figures.  In fact, domestic violence is a serious public health 
concern.7  Anyone can become a victim,8 regardless of race, gender, 
religion, sexual orientation, socioeconomic status, or educational lev-
el.9  Domestic violence can be perpetrated in the form of physical,10 
sexual,11 emotional,12 economic,13 or psychological14 abuse.  The 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimates that approxi-
mately 74.7 million people in the United States have experienced 
some form of domestic abuse in their lifetime.15  It is also estimated 
 
5 Rick Kissell, 3-Day Ratings: “People v. O.J. Simpson” is Tuesday’s No.1 Show in Key 
Demos, VARIETY (Feb. 16, 2016), http://variety.com/2016/tv/news/3-day-ratings-people-vs-
o-j-simpson-fx-1201707564/. 
6 Sarah Marshall, The People vs. O.J. Simpson Relives a Media Sensation, NEW REPUBLIC 
(Jan. 31, 2016), https://newrepublic.com/article/128762/people-vs-oj-simpson-relives-media-
sensation; Alyssa Rosenberg, Why America is Still Haunted by the O.J. Simpson Trial, THE 
WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 2, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
act-four/wp/2016/02/02/americas-unfinished-business-from-the-o-j-simpson-trial/. 
7 Linda L. Dhalberg & James A. Mercy, History of Violence as a Public Health Problem, 
11 AM. MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS 167 (2009). 
8 The author acknowledges that there are male victims of domestic violence.  However, 
data show there are more female victims of domestic violence than male victims.  For the 
purposes of consistency, in this comment, the author refers to “victims” as females, and “bat-
terers” as males. NATIONAL COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, Domestic Violence 
Statistics (2015), http://ncadv.org/files/National%20Statistics%20Domestic%20Violence% 
20NCADV.pdf. 
9 Id. 
10 The 5 Forms of Domestic Violence, WOODBRIDGE TOWNSHIP D.V.R.T., http://www. 
woodbridgedvrt.org/pages/fiveforms.html (last visited May 3, 2016) (describing physical 
abuse as inflicting or attempting to inflict physical injury and/or illness; withholding access 
to resources necessary to maintain health; and forcing alcohol and/or other drug use). 
11 Id. (describing sexual abuse as coercing or attempting to coerce any sexual contact 
without consent; and attempting to undermine a person’s sexuality). 
12 Id. (describing emotional abuse as making or attempting to undermine a person’s self-
worth). 
13 Id. (describing economic abuse as making or attempting to make a person financially 
dependent). 
14 Id. (describing psychological abuse as instilling or attempting to instill fear; and isolat-
ing or attempting to isolate one from friends, family, school, and/or work). 
15 National Intimate Partner & Sexual Violence Survey, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION (Nov. 2011), http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/nisvs_report2010-
2
Touro Law Review, Vol. 32 [2016], No. 3, Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol32/iss3/9
2016 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURTS 711 
that, in the United States, an average of twenty people per minute are 
physically abused by their intimate partners.16  Scholars and lawmak-
ers have been aware of these harrowing and growing statistics since 
the feminist movement in the 1970s.17  Various studies, journals, and 
articles have been written about victims of domestic violence – their 
psychology, the short- and long-term effects of abuse, need for advo-
cacy, and victims’ rights.18  However, little attention has been given 
to the effects of domestic violence on batterers.19  Instead, most jour-
nals focus on the pathology of the abusers, the effectiveness, or lack 
thereof, of Batterers Intervention Programs, and abusers’ efforts to 
manipulate the legal system.20  The fundamental rights of domestic 
batterers seem to take a back seat in the fight against domestic vio-
lence. 
This comment focuses on the recently established specialized 
courts in New York that attempt to address the complexities of do-
mestic violence, the Integrated Domestic Violence (IDV) courts.21  
The main goals22 of IDV courts are to hold batterers accountable and 
 
a.pdf (indicating that approximately 42.4 million women and 32.3 million men have experi-
enced rape, physical violence, and/or stalking by an intimate partner at some point in their 
lifetime). 
16 NATIONAL COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, Domestic Violence Statistics 
(2015), http://ncadv.org/files/National%20Statistics%20Domestic%20Violence%20NCADV 
.pdf. 
17 Betsy Tsai, The Trend Toward Specialized Domestic Violence Courts: Improvement on 
an Effective Innovation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1285, 1290 (2000). 
18 See generally MARY ROTHWELL DAVIS, DORCHEN A. LIEHOLDT & CHARLOTTE A. 
WATSON (eds.), LAWYER’S MANUAL ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REPRESENTING THE VICTIM (6th 
ed. 2015) (stating that twenty-eight journals were dedicated to victims). 
19 Id. (Only two journals were dedicated to offenders). 
20 Id. 
21 Integrated Domestic Violence Courts, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, 
http://www.courtinnovation.org/project/integrated-domestic-violence-court (last visited May. 
3, 2016) (New York established the first Integrated Domestic Violence courts in the Bronx, 
Monroe, Onondaga, Rensselaer, Suffolk, and Westchester counties). 
22 Amanda B. Cissner, Sarah Picard-Fritsche, & Nora Puffett, The Suffolk County Inte-
grated Domestic Violence Court: Policies, Practices, and Implications, CTR. FOR CT. 
INNOVATION 3 (Dec. 2011), http://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/documents/ 
Suffolk_IDV.pdf [hereinafter Cissner, Suffolk IDV]. 
The goals of the Integrated Domestic Violence Courts are to promote: 
1.   Informed judicial decision-making by obtaining comprehensive and up-to-date    
information on all issues involving the family; 
2.   Consistent handling of all matters relating to the same family by a single pre-
siding judge; 
3.   Efficient use of court resources, with reduced numbers of appearances, and 
speedier disposition due to greater availability of complete information; 
3
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provide victims of domestic violence with justice and access to re-
sources.23  IDV courts take various cases, such as matrimonial, civil, 
and criminal cases in front of one judge.24  This ensures that the judge 
is well informed about the entire situation and is able to provide con-
sistent orders of protection.25  While the consolidation of cases ad-
dresses the practical societal concerns of the victims, it fails to con-
sider the potentially improper ramifications for the defendants 
involved in these cases.26 
This comment argues that, while IDV courts purport to ad-
vance judicial efficiency, they neglect to consider possible infringe-
ments on the defendant’s constitutional rights.  Specifically, this 
comment will explore the constitutional dilemma created by the “one 
judge-one family”27 system of IDV courts with regard to the defend-
ant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 
This comment will be divided into four sections.  Section II of 
this comment will focus on the history of domestic violence in the 
United States and New York.  Section III will discuss the IDV courts 
in general, as well as their constitutionality.  Section IV will address 
the possible violations of Fifth Amendment rights in IDV courts.  
Specifically, it will argue that the defendant’s statements in his civil 
or matrimonial proceeding can be used against him in his criminal 
proceeding and vice-versa, potentially violating his privilege against 
 
4.   Concentration of social services and other resources to address the family 
members’ needs comprehensively; 
5.   Victim safety, by eliminating conflicting orders and decisions that do not re-
flect domestic violence or child neglect histories; 
6.   Increased confidence in the court system by reducing inefficiencies for litigants 
as well as opportunities for manipulation; and 
7.   Coordinate response and collaboration among criminal justice and child wel-
fare agencies, community-based social services and domestic violence and 
child victim advocacy groups. 
Id. at 3-4. 
23 Anat Maytal, Specialized Domestic Violence Courts: Are they Worth the Trouble in 
Massachusetts?, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 197, 198 (Note) (2008). 
24 Sarah Picard-Fritsche, Litigant Perspectives in an Integrated Domestic Violence Court: 
The Case of Yonkers, New York, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION 1 (2011) [hereinafter Picard-
Fritsche, Litigant Perspective]. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Integrated Domestic Violence Courts: Key Principles, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, 
http://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/documents/IDV_FACT_SHEET.pdf (last 
visited May. 3, 2016) (The “one family-one judge” model brings before a single judge the 
multiple criminal, family, and matrimonial disputes for families where domestic violence is 
an underlying issue). 
4
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self-incrimination.  It will also argue that participation in a Batterers 
Intervention Program, where admission of abusive behavior is re-
quired, can potentially infringe on the defendant’s privilege against 
self-incrimination.  Section V will suggest two ways to resolve the 
Fifth Amendment dilemma in IDV courts.  First, it proposes that IDV 
courts stay civil proceedings while criminal proceedings are ongoing.  
Second, it proposes the use of judicial immunity for therapeutic con-
fessions. 
II. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE UNITED STATES 
A. Historical Overview 
Intimate partner violence, usually against women, has been 
ingrained in society for centuries.28  The 499 B.C. Ancient Roman 
law, Paterfamilias, for example, reads, “If you should discover your 
wife in adultery, you may with impunity put her to death without a 
trial, but if you should commit adultery or indecency, she must not 
presume to lay a finger on you, nor does the law allow it.”29  This no-
tion remained commonplace in society, with similar laws enduring 
through the nineteenth century.30  Common law in the United States 
provided that a husband could subject his wife to corporal punish-
ment or “chastisement.”31  William Blackstone explained in his trea-
tise on English common law that a husband could “give his wife 
moderate correction.”32  Blackstone stated, 
[f]or, as he is to answer for her misbehavior, the law 
thought it reasonable to intrust him with the power of 
restraining her, by domestic chastisement, in the same 
moderation that a man is allowed to correct his ap-
prentices or children; for whom the master or parent is 
also liable in some cases to answer . . . .33 
 
28 BERRY, supra note 2, at 19 (stating that domestic violence has been reported in virtually 
all societies, and in most countries, it has been both legally and socially acceptable). 
29 Overview of Historical Laws that Supported Domestic Violence, WOMEN SAFE, 
http://www.womensafe.net/home/index.php/domesticviolence/29-overview-of-historical-
laws-that-supported-domestic-violence (last visited May 3, 2016). 
30 Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, FAC. 
SCHOLARSHIP SERIES, 2118 (1996). 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 2123 (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 442). 
33 Id. (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 430-33). 
5
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The criminalization of domestic violence did not come until 
the late 1800s.34  In 1871, the Supreme Court of Alabama rescinded 
the legal right of husbands to beat their wives.35  In Fulgham v. 
State,36 the defendant’s wife discovered him beating their children.37  
The wife intervened and voiced her distress over the excessive pun-
ishment.38  The defendant turned the whip on his wife and struck her 
twice on the back.39  The wife brought the case to court, asserting that 
her husband did not have the right to chastise her.40  The case reached 
the Alabama Supreme Court, which held that the “rule of love super-
seded the rule of force,” and the court denied the privilege of brutali-
ty against women.41  Since then, the public perception of domestic 
violence slowly shifted from a private or personal matter to a public 
health and policy concern.42 
The intense media attention of the 1994 O.J. Simpson case 
caused Americans to confront the issue of domestic violence on their 
televisions and in their newspapers and magazines almost daily.43  In-
cidentally, domestic violence hotlines became flooded with numerous 
phone calls.44  State legislators began taking the problem of domestic 
violence more seriously.45  New York was quick to respond, enacting 
the New York State Family Protection and Domestic Violence Inter-
vention Act of 1994, in January 1995.46  While the case against O.J. 
Simpson led to an acquittal, it was pivotal in achieving acknowledg-
 
34 Maytal, supra note 23, at 200. 
35 Fulgham v. State, 46 Ala. 143, 146-47 (1871) (holding that “[A] rod which may be 
drawn through the wedding ring is not now deemed necessary to teach the wife her duty and 
subjection to the husband.  The husband is therefore not justified or allowed by law to use 
such a weapon, or any other, for her moderate correction.  The wife is not to be considered 
as the husband’s slave.  And the privilege, ancient though it may be, to beat her with a stick, 
to pull her hair, choke her, spit in her face or kick her about the floor, or to inflict upon her 
like indignities, is not now acknowledged by our law.”). 
36 Id. 
37 Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, FAC. 




40 Fulgham, 46 Ala. at 145. 
41 Id. at 147. 
42 Picard-Fritsche, Litigant Perspective, supra note 24, at 1. 
43 MARGI LARID MCCUE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 53-54 (1995). 
44 Id. at 54. 
45 Id. 
46 Domestic Violence, NYCOURTS, https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/family-
violence/dv/index.shtml (last visited May 3, 2016). 
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ment that domestic violence can happen anywhere and to anybody.47  
The case brought up issues such as the danger women face after sepa-
ration, the effects of domestic violence on children, and the need to 
hold batterers accountable for their abuse.48 
B. New York 
New York has been a frontrunner in the country’s fight 
against domestic violence through its social reforms, legislation, and 
subsequent creation of specialized domestic violence courts.49  In 
June 2012, the New York State Senate passed legislation that en-
hances victim protection and increases criminal penalties for abus-
ers.50  New York defines domestic violence as “[a] pattern of coer-
cive tactics, which can include physical, psychological, sexual, 
economic and emotional abuse perpetrated by one person against an 
adult intimate partner with the goal of establishing and maintaining 
power and control over the victim.”51 
Domestic violence is a complicated matter to confront, partic-
ularly because it involves various family dynamics that affect each 
involved individual differently.52  While batterers find themselves in-
volved in the legal system, victims of abuse suffer physical and men-
tal problems as a result of domestic violence.53  It is not uncommon 
for women to lose their jobs, if they even had any, because of absen-
teeism due to illness as a result of the violence.54  Many women must 
move away from their homes, seek safety in a shelter, or find them-
selves homeless, all to avoid violence.55  These women may lose fam-
ily and friends as a result of battering.56  Many women have to forgo 
 
47 BERRY, supra note 2, at 55. 
48 BERRY, supra note 2, at 55. 
49 Suzane Cecala & Mary M. Walsh, New York State’s Response to Domestic Violence, 
OFFICE OF THE PREVENTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 4 (2006), http://opdv.ny.gov/whatisdv/ 
about_dv/nyresponse/nysdv.pdf. 
50 2012 New York State Domestic Violence and Related Laws, OFFICE OF THE PREVENTION 
OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, http://www.opdv.ny.gov/law/summ_year/sum12.html (last visited 
May 3, 2016). 
51 The Law - Domestic Violence, NYCOURTS, https://www.nycourts.gov/topics/ 
domesticViolence.shtml (last visited May 3, 2016). 
52 BERRY, supra note 2, at 29. 
53 BERRY, supra note 2, at 29 
54 BERRY, supra note 2, at 93 
55 BERRY, supra note 2, at 96. 
56 BERRY, supra note 2, at 39. 
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financial security during a divorce to avoid further abuse.57  For vic-
tims with children, the emotional and financial struggles are exacer-
bated.58  In fact, children who witness domestic violence, or who may 
have been abused, demonstrate significant behavioral and emotional 
problems59 and often require treatment and additional services on 
their own.60  In order to address this complexity more efficiently, 
New York created a specialized criminal part dedicated to addressing 
domestic violence issues.61  Currently, there are over thirty-nine do-
mestic violence parts.62  Each of these parts have specialized features, 
including a courtroom dedicated exclusively to the handling of do-
mestic violence cases with a single presiding judge, a fixed prosecu-
torial team, court staff who receive special training in domestic vio-
lence issues, innovative computer technology to aid in monitoring 
defendants, a specialized domestic violence probation program, and 
extensive services for victims.63 
Families who are affected by domestic violence also require a 
variety of legal services.64  Orders of Protection65 may either be ob-
tained in family court, matrimonial court, or issued by a judge in 
criminal court.66  Victims may have to go to family court in order to 
address custody and visitation arrangements if the parties have chil-
dren.67  Victims may also find themselves in matrimonial court 
 
57 BERRY, supra note 2, at 94. 
58 BERRY, supra note 2, at 129. 
59 BERRY, supra note 2, at 129 
60 BERRY, supra note 2, at 129 
61 Domestic Violence, NYCOURTS, https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/family-
violence/dv/index.shtml (last visited May 3, 2016). 
62 Id. 
63 Robert V. Wolf, Liberty Aldrich, & Samantha Moore, Planning a Domestic Violence 
Court, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, 1 (2004) [hereinafter Wolf, Planning DV Court]. 
64 See generally Melissa Labriola, et al., A National Portrait of Domestic Violence Courts, 
CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION (2010). 
65 Obtaining an Order of Protection, NYCOURTS, https://www.nycourts.gov/faq/ 
orderOfProtection.shtml#q1 (last visited May 3, 2016). (“An order of protection is issued by 
the court to limit the behavior of someone who harms or threatens to harm another person.  It 
is used to address various types of safety issues, including, but not limited to stipulations in-
volving domestic violence.  Family courts, criminal courts, and Supreme Courts can all issue 
orders of protection.  An order of protection may direct the offending person not to injure, 
threaten or harass you, your family, or any other person(s) listed in the order.  It may in-
clude, but is not limited to, directing him/her to stay away from you and your children, move 
out of your home, follow custody orders, pay child support, not have a gun.”). 
66 Id. 
67 See BERRY, supra note 2, at 155. 
8
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should they or their partners file for divorce.68  It is common to find 
one family unit involved in at least two or more cases simultaneous-
ly.69  Prior to 2000, parties in a domestic violence dispute in New 
York found themselves dealing with various judges in various 
courts.70  Parties involved in cases of domestic violence were often 
simultaneously involved in related cases in family, criminal, and/or 
matrimonial matters71 in the New York State Supreme Court.72  This 
fragmentation made it difficult for victims to maneuver the court sys-
tem.73  In addition, it is possible for the family court and criminal 
court to issue conflicting orders of protection against the batterer.74  
In an effort to address these issues, New York established the IDV 
courts75 in 2001.76  IDV courts are Problem-Solving Courts,77 which 
 
68 See BERRY, supra note 2, at 155 
69 Picard-Fritsche, Litigant Perspective, supra note 24, at 1. 
70 Picard-Fritsche, Litigant Perspective, supra note 24, at 1. 
71 Picard-Fritsche, Litigant Perspective, supra note 24, at 1. 
72 This comment will refer to the New York State Supreme Court as “Supreme Court.”  
Where the supreme court of another state is concerned, this comment will specify. 
73 Wolf, Planning DV Court, supra note 63, at 1. 
74 Cissner, Suffolk IDV, supra note 22, at 2. 
75 22 NYCRR § 41.1, entitled “Integrated Domestic Violence Parts of Supreme Court and 
Domestic Violence Parts of Superior Courts,” states: 
(a) Integrated Domestic Violence Parts of the Supreme Court and Do-
mestic Violence Parts of the Supreme or County Court may be estab-
lished in one or more counties by order of the Chief Administrator of the 
Courts following consultation with and agreement of the Presiding Jus-
tice of the Judicial Department in which the affected county or counties 
are located.  As provided by the rule of the Chief Administrator promul-
gated pursuant to subdivision (b) of this section: 
(1) Integrated Domestic Violence Parts shall be devoted to hearing and 
determination, in a single forum, of cases that are simultaneously pend-
ing in the courts if one of them is a domestic violence case in a criminal 
court and the other is a case in Supreme or Family Court that involves a 
party or witness in the domestic violence case; or if one is a case in crim-
inal court, Family Court or Supreme Court and the other is a case in any 
other courts having a common party or in which a disposition may affect 
the interests of a party to the first case.  The Chief Administrator also 
may provide that, where cases are disposed of in an Integrated Domestic 
Violence Part, subsequent cases that would have been eligible for dispo-
sition in such Part were they to have been pending simultaneously with 
the cases already disposed of shall be eligible for disposition therein.  
Where no Domestic Violence Part has been established in the county 
pursuant to rules of the Chief Administrator promulgated pursuant to 
subdivision (b) of this section, the Chief Administrator may also provide 
that domestic violence cases pending in a criminal court in the county 
shall be eligible for disposition in the Integrated Domestic Violence Part 
if necessary to best utilize available court and community resources for 
9
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aim to improve the New York courts’ effectiveness in meeting the 
needs of families involved in several cases.78 
III. INTEGRATED DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURTS 
New York State currently has forty-two IDV courts.79  IDV 
courts handle all related cases of a single family where the underlying 
issue is domestic violence.80  These related cases include, but are not 
limited to, criminal cases, child abuse and neglect cases, custody and 
visitation cases, and divorce cases.81  This type of integrated court 
addresses the complicated trial court structure of New York.82  In 
New York, divorce cases are handled in the matrimonial branch of 
the Supreme Court; allegations of criminal domestic violence and 
child abuse are prosecuted in any of the several criminal courts, in-
cluding the Domestic Violence parts; and tort claims, custody, visita-
tion, and other family matters are resolved in family court.83  Howev-
er, these different courts all have concurrent jurisdiction over 
 
domestic violence cases. 
2) Domestic Violence Parts shall be devoted to the hearing and determi-
nation of domestic violence cases pending in criminal court in the county 
if necessary to best utilize available court and community resources for 
domestic violence cases. 
(b) The Chief Administrator shall promulgate rules to regulate operation 
of Integrated Domestic Violence Parts in Supreme Court and Domestic 
Violence Parts in Supreme and County Courts.  The rules of the Inte-
grated Domestic Violence Parts shall permit a justice of the Supreme 
Court to transfer to such court, for disposition in an Integrated Domestic 
Violence Part thereof, any eligible case pending in another court in the 
same county.  The rules of the Domestic Violence Parts shall permit a 
justice of the Supreme Court or a judge of the County Court to transfer 
to such court, for disposition in a Domestic Violence Part thereof, any el-
igible case pending another criminal court in the same county. 
76 Integrated Domestic Violence Court, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, 
http://www.courtinnovation.org/project/integrated-domestic-violence-court (last visited May 
3, 2016). 
77 See infra note 230 and accompanying text. 
78 Cissner, Suffolk IDV, supra note 22, at 1, 2. 
79 Domestic Violence, NYCOURTS, https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/family-
violence/dv/index.shtml (last visited May 3, 2016). 
80 Cissner, Suffolk IDV, supra note 22, at 1, 2. 
81 Domestic Violence, NYCOURTS, https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/family-
violence/dv/index.shtml (last visited May 3, 2016). 
82 Id. 
83 Cissner, Suffolk IDV, supra note 22, at 1. 
10
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issuance of Orders of Protection.84  This means that victims of do-
mestic violence may obtain an order of protection at any and all of 
these courts.85  This fragmented system, combined with the complica-
tions inherent in domestic violence dispute, result in conflicting court 
orders, repeated interviews with parties, unnecessary delays, multiple 
court appearances, and other complications.86 
A. Transfer of Case to IDV Courts 
Unlike other Problem-Solving courts, defendants cannot elect 
to opt-in or opt-out of IDV courts.87  In IDV courts, a project director 
reviews cases from a database to find any cases that are open in both 
criminal court and family or matrimonial court.88  These cases are 
then presented to the judge and reviewed to be determined whether 
they meet the criteria for transfer to IDV courts.89  In New York, Part 
141 of the Rules of the Chief Judge defines an IDV eligible case as “a 
domestic violence case commenced in a criminal court and a case 
commenced in Supreme or Family Court that involves a party or wit-
ness in the domestic violence case . . .” simultaneously pending in the 
county.90  The criminal allegation of domestic violence forms the 
threshold requirement for entry into the IDV courts.91 
Once it is determined that a case is appropriate, the IDV judge 
issues a formal transfer request of the various cases to the IDV 
courts.92  The case is then placed on the IDV judge’s calendar, and 
the judge reviews the pretrial status of the defendant.93  In reviewing 
 
84 Obtaining an Order of Protection, NYCOURTS, https://www.nycourts.gov/faq/ 
orderOfProtection.shtml#q1 (last visited May 3, 2016). 
85 Id. 
86 Integrated Domestic Violence Court, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, 
http://www.courtinnovation.org/project/integrated-domestic-violence-court (last visited May 
3, 2016). 
87 Domestic Violence, NYCOURTS, https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/family-
violence/dv/index.shtml (last visited Mar. 1, 2016). 
88 Daniel D. Angiolillo, The Integrated Domestic Violence Court: New York’s Successful 
Experience, in LAWYER’S MANUAL ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: REPRESENTING THE VICTIM 152 
(Mary Rothwell Davis, et al., (eds.) 6th ed., 2015) [hereinafter Angiolillo, IDV Court]. 
89 Angiolillo, IDV Court, supra note 88. 
90 22 NYCRR § 141.1(b). 
91 NYCOURTS, NEW YORK STATE PROBLEM SOLVING COURTS (2015). 
92 IDV Frequently Asked Questions, NYCOURTS, https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/ 
10jd/suffolk/IDV/IDVQuestions.shtml#faqfunction (last visited May 3, 2016) [hereinafter 
Frequently Asked Questions]. 
93 Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 92. 
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the pre-trial status of the defendant, the judge makes sure that there is 
an order of protection in place, and the defendants who are not held 
pending trial are enrolled in, or referred to, a Batterers Intervention 
Program.94  Cases that are transferred to IDV courts are not consoli-
dated, but proceed according to the substantive and procedural law of 
the originating court.95  Each case is assigned a new docket number, 
and heard separately during one court appearance.96  Although inte-
grating various cases under one court provides efficiency for all par-
ties involved, questions have been raised as to the constitutionality of 
these court transfers. 
B. Constitutionality 
The constitutionality of the IDV courts was questioned for the 
first time in People v. Fernandez.97  In this case, Fernandez was ac-
cused of threatening and harassing his former paramour on several 
occasions over the phone.98  Fernandez was subsequently charged 
with aggravated harassment in the second degree based on his ac-
tions.99  Thereafter, a court ordered Fernandez’s case to be transferred 
to the IDV Part of the Supreme Court of Kings County, where he was 
convicted of the charges against him.100  The main issue on appeal 
was whether, under the New York State Constitution, the IDV part of 
the Supreme Court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear misde-
meanor charges without a grand jury indictment or a superior court 
information.101 
In its analysis, the court looked to the language of the New 
York Constitution, which states that the Supreme Court has the pow-
 
94 EDWARD W. GONDOLF, BATTERER INTERVENTION SYSTEMS, 9-13 (2001). Batterers in-
tervention programs are an innovative effort of the American social service system to ad-
dress the growing problem of domestic violence in the country.  These programs generally 
consist of weekly group counseling sessions for men and women arrested for assaulting their 
partners.  These programs employ various theoretical frameworks, such as psycho-
educational, psychodynamic, and the Duluth model. Id. 
95 Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 92. 
96 Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 92. 
97 897 N.Y.S.2d 158 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2010) (stating that the principal issue presented 
on this appeal was a first impression for this court). 
98 Id. at 160. 
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er to adjudicate all causes of action, including misdemeanors.102  The 
court then discussed the constitutionality of IDV parts, and stated that 
the constitution authorized removal of misdemeanor cases to the IDV 
parts of the Supreme Court.103  Nevertheless, Fernandez argued that 
the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction over his case because he 
had not been indicted by a grand jury, nor had the district attorney 
filed a written accusation against him in a superior court, as required 
under CPL § 210.05.104  The court rejected this argument holding that 
“CPL 210.05 merely prescribes the method and manner required for a 
prosecutor to prosecute an offense . . . it was not intended to prohibit 
the Supreme Court from exercising its jurisdiction under the New 
York State Constitution, nor can it.”105  The court, therefore, affirmed 
the trial court’s judgment against Fernandez.106 
This case established that an IDV court, as a Supreme Court, 
is not constitutionally limited in the cases that it may hear.  Further, it 
established that IDV courts may order the removal and transfer of 
criminal and civil cases to their jurisdiction.  However, the transfer of 
these cases, which has varying procedural and substantive laws, un-
der one court creates a constitutional problem for the defendants in 
these proceedings.  Specifically, this integration raises a potential for 
a violation of a defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. 
IV. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AND IDV COURTS 
The origin of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution is the English common law.107  The English courts initially 
relied on the Latin maxim, nemo teneture seipsum prodere – “no man 
is bound to accuse himself” – to protect the accused from unjust 
methods of interrogation.108  In the eighteenth century, the English 
courts established the privilege against self-incrimination as a funda-
 
102 People v. Fernandez, 897 N.Y.S.2d at 162 (citing N.Y. CONST., art. VI § 7(a)). 
103 Id. at 163, 164. 
104 Id. at 165 (citing CPL § 210.05, which provides, “The only methods of prosecuting an 
offense in a superior court are by an indictment filed therewith by a grand jury or by a supe-
rior court information filed therewith by a district attorney”). 
105 Id. at 166. 
106 Id. at 167. 
107 LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 368 (1968). 
108 Id. at 3. 
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mental right of criminal defendants.109  This was adopted by the 
American courts, and in 1789, was added to the Bill of Rights.110 
The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person . . . shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”111  
The privilege against self-incrimination applies to the states under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.112  New York State has adopted the language 
of the Fifth Amendment, providing, for the most part, similar protec-
tions under this clause.113  The privilege against self-incrimination is 
not limited to criminal cases.114  The United States Supreme Court 
has held that this fundamental right applies to both criminal and civil 
proceedings.115  In the United States Supreme Court case, Leftkowitz 
v. Turley,116 the court held that: 
The Amendment not only protects the individual 
against being involuntarily called as a witness against 
himself in a criminal prosecution but also privileges 
him not to answer official questions put to him in any 
other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, 
where the answers might incriminate him in future 
criminal proceedings.117 
The privilege against self-incrimination, therefore, guarantees 
every person the right to remain silent when there is real and substan-
tial risk of incrimination.118  This constitutional privilege also protects 
against any communication that links “a chain of evidence” that 
 
109 STEVEN SALKY & PAUL B. HYNES, THE PRIVILEGE OF SILENCE 2 (2d ed.) (2009). 
110 Id. at 2, 3. 
111 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
112 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (holding that “the Fifth Amendment’s excep-
tion from compulsory self-incrimination is also protected by the Fourteenth Amendment 
against abridgement by the States). 
113 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 (stating in relevant part that “[n]o person shall . . . be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself or herself . . .”). 
114 McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924) (stating “The privilege is not ordinarily 
dependent upon the nature of the proceeding in which the testimony is sought or is to be 
used.  It applies alike to civil and criminal proceedings, whenever the answer might tend to 
subject criminal responsibility him who gives it”). 
115 Id. 
116 414 U.S. 70 (1973). 
117 Id. at 77. 
118 Jessica Wilen Berg, Give me Liberty or Give me Silence: Taking a Stand on Fifth 
Amendment Implications for Court-Ordered Therapy Programs, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 700, 
796 (1994) [hereinafter Berg, Liberty or Silence] (citing Minor v. United States, 396 U.S. 87, 
98 (1969)). 
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could be used for further prosecution.119  In Murphy v. Waterfront 
Commission of New York Harbor,120 Justice Goldberg discussed the 
values and purposes of the privilege against self-incrimination.121  He 
stated: 
It reflects many of our fundamental values and most 
noble aspirations: our unwillingness to subject those 
suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-
accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an 
accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of 
criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating state-
ments will be elicited by inhumane treatment and 
abuses;. . . .122 
The courts realized that, while the privilege functions as a “shelter to 
the guilty,” it often provides “protection to the innocent.”123  The val-
ues and purpose of the Fifth Amendment have expanded over the 
years.  More recently, this privilege against self-incrimination has 
been viewed as providing individuals with their “most treasured pro-
tections – preservation of our autonomy, privacy, and dignity against 
the threat of state coercion.”124 
The Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination applies 
when a communication is “testimonial, incriminating, and com-
pelled.”125  First, the United States Supreme Court defines testimonial 
communications as spoken words or actions, whether explicit or im-
plicit, that reveal one’s thoughts, beliefs, or knowledge.126  Second, a 
communication is compelled when, by an action of the government 
or a body of authority, one makes a statement under undue influence, 
force or coercion.127  Lastly, a communication is incriminating when 
a person’s testimony creates a real and ascertainable risk of exposing 
 
119 Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951); Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17, 21-
22 (2001) (per curiam). 
120 378 U.S. 52 (1964). 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 55. 
123 Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161-62 (1995). 
124 State v. Reyes, 2 P.3d 725, 733 (Haw. Ct. App. 2000). 
125 Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial, 542 U.S. 177, 189 (2004). 
126 United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 35, 42-43 (2000); Doe v. United States, 487 
U.S. 201, 209-11 (1988). 
127 United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187-88, 190 (1977) (stating that the test for 
compulsion “is whether, considering the totality of the circumstances, the free will of the 
witness was overborne” Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544 (1961)). 
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himself to future criminal charges.128  This constitutional privilege, 
however, is not automatic.129  Therefore, a defendant must expressly 
assert his Fifth Amendment right; otherwise, it is waived.130 
There are, however, two situations where the privilege against 
self-incrimination is self-executing.131  The first situation involves 
custodial interrogations.132  This situation usually arises when an in-
dividual is being interrogated while in police custody.133  The second 
situation where the privilege against self-incrimination is self-
executing involves penalty cases.134  The United States Supreme 
Court has held that an individual’s Fifth Amendment privilege is vio-
lated when the “State not only compel[s] an individual to appear and 
testify but also [seeks] to induce him to forgo [his] Fifth Amendment 
privilege by threats to impose economic or other sanctions ‘capable 
of forcing self-incrimination.’ ”135  This is particularly evident in cas-
es where defendants are punished for invoking their Fifth Amend-
ment right and choosing to remain silent.136 
Defendants in IDV courts find themselves in concurrent pro-
ceedings where a judge has access to all their information from their 
criminal, family and matrimonial cases.137  This situation creates a 
risk that the defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination will be violated because each case is usually heard in 
 
128 Id. at 765-69. 
129 Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 427-28 (1984). 
130 Id. 
131 Berg, Liberty or Silence, supra note 118, at 712-13. 
132 Berg, Liberty or Silence, supra note 118, at 712. 
133 Murphy, 465 U.S. at 429-30 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966)). 
134 Berg, Liberty or Silence, supra note 118, at 713. 
135 Murphy, 465 U.S. at 434 (quoting Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 806 
(1977)). 
136 Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 52-53 (1968) (“Substantial hazards of incrim-
ination as to past or present acts plainly may stem from the requirements to register and to 
pay the occupational tax.  In the first place, satisfaction of those requirements increases the 
likelihood that any past or present gambling offenses will be discovered and successfully 
prosecuted.  It both centers attention upon the registrant as a gambler, and compels “injuri-
ous disclosure[s]” which may provide or assist in the collection of evidence admissible in a 
prosecution of past or present offenses.  These offenses need not include actual gambling; 
they might involve only the custody or transportation of gambling paraphernalia, or other 
preparations for future gambling.  Further, the acquisition of a federal gambling tax stamp, 
requiring as it does the declaration of a present intent to commence gambling activities, 
obliges even a prospective gambler to accuse himself of conspiracy to violate either state 
gambling prohibitions, or federal laws forbidding the use of interstate facilities for gambling 
purposes”). 
137 Angiolillo, IDV Court, supra note 88, at 151-52. 
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one day, one after the other.138  Furthermore, defendants in IDV 
courts usually find themselves mandated to Batterers Intervention 
Programs as part of their plea agreements or conditions of bail.139  
Section A will discuss the concurrent proceedings in IDV courts and 
their implications for the IDV defendant.  It will demonstrate that 
statements made by defendants during these concurrent proceedings 
would most likely satisfy the three elements required to establish that 
a Fifth Amendment right exists.140  Section B will discuss the treat-
ment mandates imposed in IDV courts and how treatment confes-
sions likely fall under Fifth Amendment penalty cases.141 
A. Concurrent Civil-Criminal Proceedings 
Courts that combine civil and criminal cases, such as IDV 
courts, increase the possibility that a defendant’s Fifth Amendment 
right would be violated because the statements that he makes in these 
proceedings are likely testimonial, coerced, and incriminating.142  The 
Supreme Court in United States v. Ward143 stated, “[T]he distinction 
between civil penalty and criminal penalty is of some constitutional 
import.”144  Criminal and civil courts have different practices, proce-
dures, and burdens of proof.145  However, the essential difference be-
tween these courts is their purpose.146  The goal of civil court is to 
correct a legal wrong by awarding monetary or equitable relief to the 
plaintiff.147  The purpose of criminal courts, on the other hand, is to 
 
138 Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 92. 
139 Angiolillo, IDV Court, supra note 88, at 153. 
140 See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
141 See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
142 See Ex parte Rawls, 953 So.2d 374, 387 (2006) (stating “The civil divorce proceeding 
and the criminal proceeding based on the stalking charge are parallel proceedings, and Bry-
an’s Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination in the criminal proceeding is 
threatened if the divorce proceeding is not stayed”); Hoover v. Knight, 678 F.2d 578, 581 
(5th Cir. 1982) (recognizing that “[F]ifth [A]mendment issues frequently arise when parallel 
criminal, civil or administrative proceedings are pending”). 
143 448 U.S. 242 (1980). 
144 Id. at 248. 
145 Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal 
Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 
HASTINGS L.J. 1325, 1352 (1991) (civil courts have a preponderance of the evidence burden 
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protect society by punishing the defendant.148  While there is an arse-
nal of civil remedies, there are more fundamental rights afforded to a 
criminal defendant because of the severity of punishment he would  
face should he be found guilty.149 
Although the privilege against self-incrimination provides 
broad protections, it is not absolute particularly in civil cases.150  This 
becomes a problem for defendants who find themselves in IDV 
courts where one judge hears these simultaneous proceedings.  The 
factual overlap between these cases creates a particular risk for the 
defendants in that their statements in one proceeding may be used 
against them in another.151  A survey conducted by the Battered 
Women’s Justice Project on specialized criminal domestic violence 
courts suggested that combined civil and criminal jurisdiction may 
inappropriately encourage judges and prosecutors to focus on facts 
that should not influence their decisions in criminal cases.152 
A study conducted by the Center for Court Innovation regard-
ing the litigant’s perspective of IDV courts revealed that only 44% of 
defendants felt that their cases were treated fairly.153  In addition, 
over 75% of defendants reported being unhappy with the judge’s de-
cision in their family court case.154  Their satisfaction with their case 
outcomes was significantly related to whether they viewed the IDV 
courts process as fair or not.155  What is most concerning is that 80% 
 
148 Id. 
149 See generally Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to 
Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law 
Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325 (1991). 
150 See Mertsching v. United States, 704 F.2d 505, 507 (10th Cir. 1983) (noting that privi-
lege against self-incrimination does not shield tax preparer from giving testimony because 
penalties are civil in nature); Attor v. Attor, 894 A.2d 83, 92-93 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2006) (holding that trial court erred when it allowed the wife to assert her Fifth Amendment 
privilege because statutes of limitations had run and her fear of deportation was only a civil 
hardship). 
151 Picard-Fritsche, Litigant Perspective, supra note 24, at 18. 
152 Julie A. Helling, Specialized Criminal Domestic Violence Courts, BATTERED WOMEN'S 
JUSTICE PROJECT 6 (1999), http://www.bwjp.org/assets/documents/pdfs/specialized_criminal 
_domestic_violence_courts.pdf (stating that victims sometimes ask the prosecutor to dismiss 
or reduce the charges of the defendant because the victim feared that the defendant would 
not pay child or spousal support.  Judges have also asked prosecutors to dismiss a criminal 
charge after having granted an Order of Protection against the defendant). 
153 Picard-Fritsche, Litigant Perspective, supra note 24, at 13. 
154 Picard-Fritsche, Litigant Perspective, supra note 24, at 18 (noting that 69% “of both 
victims and defendants reported that they got very little or none of what they wanted” from 
their family case outcome). 
155 Picard-Fritsche, Litigant Perspective, supra note 24, at 18. 
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of both victims and defendants felt the judge used information from 
their criminal case in making decisions about their family court case, 
or vice-versa.156  These results show that having the criminal, family 
and matrimonial cases under one court to be heard in front of one 
judge potentially violates the defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination. 
1. Dilemma in Concurrent Proceedings 
The one family-one judge structure of IDV courts can blur the 
procedural differences between criminal and civil courts thereby in-
creasing the chance that a defendant’s Fifth Amendment right would 
be violated.157  Although each case in the IDV courts retains its own 
docket, the fact that one judge hears each case in one day, beginning 
with the criminal case, places the defendant in a problematic position 
of whether to remain silent and suffer the consequences, or waive his 
Fifth Amendment right and suffer possible consequences of this con-
fession.158 
Havell v. Islam159 highlights the differences among civil, mat-
rimonial and criminal cases, and it also illustrates the dangers had 
these cases been integrated under one court.160  In Havell, the parties 
were involved in concurrent matrimonial and criminal cases.161  The 
parties were married for twenty-one years with six children.162  On 
April 15, 1999, the plaintiff allegedly informed the defendant that she 
wanted a divorce.163  On the morning of April 22, 1999, the defendant 
repeatedly struck the plaintiff’s face and head with a barbell, severely 
injuring her.164  The defendant was subsequently arrested and charged 
for second degree attempted murder and first degree assault.165  Sub-
 
156 Picard-Fritsche, Litigant Perspective, supra note 24, at 19. 
157 Angiolillo, IDV Court, supra note 88, at 151-52 (stating that the judge in IDV courts 
must maintain objectivity because he presides over both family and criminal cases of one 
family, and “is in possession of the pertinent information on the related cases”). 
158 Cf. Baltimore City Department of Social Services v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549 (1990) 
(where defendant had to choose between producing her child and possibly being incarcerated 
or asserting her Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and be in contempt of court). 
159 718 N.Y.S.2d 807 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000). 
160 Id. 
161 Id. at 808. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
164 Havell, 718 N.Y.S.2d at 808. 
165 Id. 
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sequently, the plaintiff filed a divorce action against the defendant.166  
A month later, the defendant was alleged to have violated the terms 
of his temporary order of protection when he went into the marital 
residence with his attorney to remove personal property.167 
The defendant requested a stay for his contempt case.168  He 
argued that the concurrent criminal cases, one arising from his at-
tempted murder charge and the other from a violation of an order of 
protection, would open him to a risk of self-incrimination.169  Specifi-
cally, the defendant argued that testifying about his violation could 
lead to inferences about his state of mind, which could be used 
against him in his pending attempted murder case.170  In deciding 
whether to grant such stay, the court looked to the factors used by 
federal courts.171  Finding that several factors applied in this case, the 
trial court stayed the criminal contempt proceeding for six months.172 
In the divorce action, the defendant filed a motion to preclude 
the plaintiff’s offering any evidence concerning his conduct during 
marriage.173  The trial court, however, denied the defendant’s motion, 
which the Appellate Division affirmed.174  The court reasoned that 
while conduct is generally not considered in determining equitable 
distribution, there are exceptions to this rule.175  Specific to this case 
was the catchall provision, which includes “misconduct that ‘shocks 
the conscience’ of the court.”176  Having found that the defendant’s 
conduct falls under this exception, which had been substantiated by 
several witnesses, the court held that the trial court did not err in con-
sidering the defendant’s abusive behaviors toward his wife in deter-
mining equitable distribution.177 
This case demonstrates the complexity of domestic violence 
cases, and how these cases are usually ongoing.  This also shows the 
 
166 Havell v. Islam, 751 N.Y.S.2d 449, 449 (1st Dep't 2002). 
167 Id. at 451. 
168 MELISSA L. BERGER ET AL., NEW YORK LAW OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (2014) (citing 





173 Havell, 751 N.Y.S.2d at 451. 
174 Id. at 451, 455. 
175 Id. at 452. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 452-55. 
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possible dilemma that defendants face when there are concurrent pro-
ceedings similar to those in IDV courts.  Often, a defendant would 
have to choose between testifying and risking that his statements 
would be used against him at a later proceeding or asserting his privi-
lege against self-incrimination and risking other consequences of his 
silence. 
2. Implications for the IDV Defendants 
The construction of IDV courts, where one judge hears all the 
cases of one family, creates unique issues for the defendants, includ-
ing having to choose between asserting their Fifth Amendment right 
and risking the consequences of their silence.178  Defendants are held 
to a great degree of accountability in IDV courts because of their fre-
quent interaction with the judge.179  The judge probes the defendant 
about his life and compliance with court mandates, such as orders of 
protection and participation in Batterers Intervention treatment.180  
Judges, prosecutors, caseworkers, probation officers, treatment pro-
viders, and sometimes, defense attorneys also meet beforehand to 
discuss the defendant’s progress, or lack thereof, in treatment.181 
In Suffolk County, New York, all of these participants 
streamline the court process by sharing information with each oth-
er.182  Prosecutors, although not involved in the defendant’s family or 
matrimonial cases, often observe these hearings.183  The rationale be-
hind this is that it enables the court to make better, more informed 
decisions regarding the complexities of domestic violence cases.184  
This streamlining of access to information is a key characteristic of 
IDV courts.185  This structure provides several benefits to both the 
court and victims, which includes efficiency in handling the various 
 
178 Julie A. Helling, Specialized Criminal Domestic Violence Courts, BATTERED WOMEN'S 
JUSTICE PROJECT 6 (1999), http://www.bwjp.org/assets/documents/pdfs/specialized_criminal 
_domestic_violence_courts.pdf. 
179 Amanda B. Cissner, Melissa Labriola & Michael Rempel, Testing the Effects of New 
York's Domestic Violence Courts, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION 29 (2013) [hereinafter Cissner, 
Testing Effects]. 
180 Cissner, Testing Effects, supra note 179. 
181 Cissner, Testing Effects, supra note 179, at 28-29. 
182 Keri M. Herzog, Suffolk County District Attorney, Speaker at Touro Law Center As-
signed Counsel Defender Plan of Suffolk County Seminar (Feb. 16, 2016). 
183 Id. 
184 Angiolillo, IDV Court, supra note 88, at 151. 
185 Angiolillo, IDV Court, supra note 88, at 151. 
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cases of the parties.186  Nevertheless, the integration of these cases 
and the process of hearing each case in one day in front of one judge 
create a potential for a Fifth Amendment violation. 
The defendant’s statements during these hearings can be con-
sidered testimonial because they reveal the contents of his mind.187  
His statements in his criminal case, if used in his civil or matrimonial 
case, and vice-versa could be considered incriminating.188  Further-
more, if the defendant is forced to report about his program mandates 
or adherence to his orders of protection, these statements would be 
considered compelled, thereby violating his privilege against self-
incrimination.189  Unfortunately, IDV courts seem to minimize and 
overlook this concern despite its seriousness.190  Another area where 
a defendant’s Fifth Amendment right might be violated is through 
mandated participation in a treatment program. 
B. Treatment Mandate as used in IDV Courts 
Requiring a defendant to admit to alleged abusive behaviors 
as part of his plea agreement is a potential violation of his Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination.191  Domestic violence 
courts emphasize the need to keep the victims safe and the offenders 
accountable for their actions.192  Accountability not only involves ac-
knowledging one’s abusive behavior, but also admitting that one has 
indeed been abusive toward his partner.193  This admission could lead 
to further consequences for a defendant.  However, denials could also 
lead to further consequences as the court might see these as noncom-
pliance.194  A mandate to participate in a treatment program, there-
fore, could be considered falling under penalty cases, thereby raising 
a Fifth Amendment violation.195 
 
186 Julie A. Helling, Specialized Criminal Domestic Violence Courts, BATTERED WOMEN'S 
JUSTICE PROJECT 10-12 (1999), http://www.bwjp.org/assets/documents/pdfs/specialized_ 
criminal_domestic_violence_courts.pdf. 
187 See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
188 See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
189 See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
190 Angiolillo, IDV Court, supra note 88, at 152. 
191 Berg, Liberty or Silence, supra note 118, at 702. 
192 Angiolillo, IDV Court, supra note 88, at 151. 
193 VIBS Fam. Violence & Rape Crisis Ctr., Program Manual (2006) (unpublished pro-
gram curriculum) (no file with the VIBS HALT Program). 
194 Angiolillo, IDV Court, supra note 88, at 153. 
195 See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text. 
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1. Batterers Intervention Program 
Mandating a defendant to a Batterers Intervention Program196 
before a conviction has been rendered unfairly subjects him to the 
stigma of being a batterer without a finding of guilt or innocence, 
which violates his due process rights, and likely violates his Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination.197  Treatment mandate is 
usually part of the defendant’s bail condition or plea agreement for a 
lower sentence.198  The United States Supreme Court upheld the con-
stitutionality of this type of plea-bargaining, stating: 
[W]e cannot hold that it is unconstitutional for the 
state to extend a benefit to a defendant who in turn ex-
tends a substantial benefit to the government who 
demonstrates by his plea that he is willing to admit his 
crime and enter the correctional system in a frame of 
mind that affords hope for successful rehabilitation in 
a shorted period that might otherwise be necessary.199 
Most states believe that the interests in facilitating rehabilitation and 
avoiding the expense of a full trial are sufficient to justify encourag-
ing a guilty plea, despite the potential for unfair pressure on the de-
fendant.200 
Several appellate courts throughout the United States have 
permitted court mandates to treatment programs as well as therapeu-
tic confessions.201  Most courts do not see these as coerced confes-
sions falling under a violation of the Fifth Amendment right against 
self-incrimination.202  Instead, judges, in their discretion, view the 
therapeutic confession as a way to hold respondents accountable in 
family offense matters.203  Regardless of whether the therapeutic con-
fession would be appropriate in certain domestic violence matters, a 
question remains as to whether a defendant’s confession or therapeu-
tic accountability “incriminate[s] him in a pending or later criminal 
 
196 Wolf, Planning DV Court, supra note 63, at 9 (noting that New York does not have a 
unified model or guideline for Batterers Intervention Programs). 
197 Wolf, Planning DV Court, supra note 63, at 10-11. 
198 Angiolillo, IDV Court, supra note 88, at 153. 
199 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 743, 753 (1970). 
200 Id. 
201 Berg, Liberty or Silence, supra note 118, at 954. 
202 Berg, Liberty or Silence, supra note 118, at 954. 
203 Berg, Liberty or Silence, supra note 118, at 954. 
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prosecution.”204  This then creates another conflict wherein the de-
fendant might construe these programs as punitive instead of rehabili-
tative. 
Interventions for domestic violence offenders begin with a 
basic philosophy of eliminating the offender’s abusive behavior to-
wards women.205  The priority of the program at all times is the safety 
of women and children.206  In a Batterers Intervention Program, a 
psycho-educational group modality is utilized to hold the abuser ac-
countable for past abusive behavior while promoting a responsibility 
for change.207  A cornerstone of a Batterers Intervention Program is a 
belief that these defendants abuse their victims in order to gain and 
maintain power and control over them.208  While participants in the 
program may claim that they have benefitted from group participa-
tion, this goal is typically secondary to the objective of promoting 
safety for women.209 
In order to be accepted into a Batterers Intervention Program, 
these defendants must agree to three main requirements.210  First, de-
fendants must make a commitment to change.211  Second, to show 
this commitment, defendants are expected to demonstrate strict at-
tendance.212  Lastly, defendants must make the commitment to act in 
a nonviolent, non-threatening manner prior to beginning the pro-
gram.213  These defendants are, therefore, expected to admit their 
abusive behaviors toward their victims in order to make these com-
 
204 Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435. 
205 VIBS Fam. Violence & Rape Crisis Ctr., Program Manual (2006) (unpublished pro-
gram curriculum) (on file with the VIBS HALT Program). 
206 Id. 
207 Id. 
208 Id. The basic tenets of the program are: 
1. Batterers are abusive in order to maintain POWER and CONTROL over their part-
ners 
2. Battering is a CHOICE 
3. Battering is a LEARNED BEHAVIOR 
4. Battering is a CRIME 
5. Battering is solely the RESPONSIBILITY of the abuser 
Id. 
209 VIBS Fam. Violence & Rape Crisis Ctr., Program Manual (2006) (unpublished pro-
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mitments and successfully complete the program.214 
Treatment providers are required to submit monthly progress 
reports to the various mandating agencies, including IDV courts.215  
Unfortunately, offenders often deny the commission of an offense 
and the inappropriateness of their actions.216  IDV courts and treat-
ment providers believe that before rehabilitation can take place, an 
individual must first admit and acknowledge that he has a problem.217  
However, to a defendant, admitting and acknowledging the problem 
is an admission of guilt.218  Offenders who fail to acknowledge their 
abusive behavior face the risk of restarting the program or being ter-
minated from the program.219  This then blurs the lines between the 
punitive and therapeutic purpose of Batterers Intervention Programs. 
In People v. Bongiovanni,220 the defendant was charged with 
assaulting his wife.221  He was then mandated to attend a domestic 
violence program as a condition of his bail.222  The defendant filed a 
motion to vacate his bail condition, stating that this was unreasona-
ble.223  The court, in its analysis, stated that it is authorized, by stat-
ute, to set a condition of bail when necessary.224  It further reasoned 
that domestic violence requires intense judicial attention because of 
its complexity and damage to families.225  The court then related pro-
gram mandates to orders of protection: that they serve the same pur-
pose of imposing punitive restrictions on the defendant.226  Moreover, 
they serve as a reminder to the defendant that his freedom can be re-
scinded should he fail to comply with the mandate.227  As such, the 
 
214 VIBS Fam. Violence & Rape Crisis Ctr., Program Manual (2006) (unpublished pro-
gram curriculum) (on file with the VIBS HALT Program). 
215 Id. 
216 Jeffrey A. Klotz, et al., Cognitive Restructuring Through Law: A Therapeutic Juris-




219 VIBS Fam. Violence & Rape Crisis Ctr., Program Manual (2006) (unpublished pro-
gram curriculum) (on file with the VIBS HALT Program). 
220 701 N.Y.S.2d 613 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999). 
221 Id. at 613. 
222 Id. at 613-14. 
223 Id. at 613. 
224 Id. at 614. 
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court denied the defendant’s motion to vacate his bail condition.228  
This case illustrates, what seems to be the general view of IDV 
courts, that treatment programs are merely tools to punish or further 
punish a defendant.229  This emphasizes the concern regarding thera-
peutic confessions and how they likely violate a defendant’s Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination. 
2. Therapeutic Confessions 
IDV courts are part of a much larger system of problem-
solving courts.230  Problem-solving courts are courts aimed at reduc-
ing crime and increasing public safety.231  With increased judicial 
oversight through weekly or bi-weekly monitoring, intensive pre- and 
post-sentencing case management or supervision, and a general phi-
losophy of therapeutic and restorative justice, the goal of the prob-
lem-solving court is to address the core issues underlying criminal 
conduct in order to prevent future harm.232 
However, unlike other problem-solving courts where rehabili-
tation is the focus, the purpose of IDV courts is not rehabilitation or 
treatment of offenders.233  Judges and prosecutors use program man-
dates in IDV courts as pre-disposition condition of bail and a way to 
closely monitor defendants.234  However, if these mandates are purely 
punitive, then the required confession that the defendant makes in or-
der to be admitted into a program can be said to be coerced and in-
 
228 Id. 
229 Angiolillo, IDV Court, supra note 88, at 153. A defendant is warned: 
Noncompliance with any of these mandated programs will result in your 
bail being increased possibly to an amount that you may not be able to 
make.  If this were to occur, you will be housed at the Westchester 
County Jail awaiting disposition of this case.  Noncompliance will result 
in your case being advanced on the court calendar.  We will not wait un-
til the scheduled court date to address noncompliance.  In other words, 
noncompliance will be addressed immediately.  If you fail to appear, a 
warrant will be issued…. 
Angiolillo, IDV Court, supra note 88, at 153 
230 Angiolillo, IDV Court, supra note 88, at 151. 
231 See generally AMERICAN COUNCIL OF CHIEF DEFENDERS, Ten Tenets of Fair and Effec-
tive Problem-Solving Courts, http://www.nlada.org/Defender/Defender_ACCD/ACCD 
_TenTenets (last visited May 3, 2016). (enumerating the Ten Tenets of Problem-solving 
courts). 
232 Id. 
233 Angiolillo, IDV Court, supra note 88, at 151. 
234 Angiolillo, IDV Court, supra note 88, at 151, 153. 
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criminating.235  Alternatively, a therapeutic confession could fall un-
der the category of penalty cases since defendants who refuse to 
comply or choose to remain silent are likely to face consequences for 
their noncompliance.236 
In State v. Rickert,237 the defendant was arrested and charged 
with assaulting and harassing his partner, as well as for violating his 
order of protection.238  The defendant pled nolo contendere to all 
charges.239  Part of his plea condition was an order of probation and a 
mandate to participate and complete a Domestic Abuse Education 
Program (DAEP).240 
At the defendant’s intake evaluation at DAEP, he denied any 
abuse behaviors and all the allegations against him.241  The defendant 
also denied particular facts relating to his charges,242 including mak-
ing verbal threats to kill his victim and intimidating her with a gun.243  
He did, however, admit to other abusive behaviors, such as breaking 
his own belongings, yelling and screaming at his victim, calling her 
names, and displaying inconsistent emotions as a form of power.244  
Because of the defendant’s denial and lack of insight, the intake 
worker denied the defendant placement in the domestic violence pro-
gram, stating, “[H]e made himself unavailable to treatment.”245  Upon 
receipt of the intake worker’s report, the probation officer filed a 
complaint for violation and revocation proceedings.246  The complaint 
alleged that the defendant did not take responsibility for his behaviors 
associated with these convictions.247  The trial court revoked the de-
fendant’s probation condition as a result.248 
 
235 See supra notes 127, 128 and accompanying text. 
236 See supra notes 134, 135 and accompanying text. 
237 665 A.2d 887 (Vt. 1995). 




242 William A. Nelson, The New Inquisition: State Compulsion of Therapeutic Confes-
sions, 20 VT. L. REV. 951, 958 (1996) (citing Transcript of Violation of Probation Merits 
Hearing at 27 (Feb. 7, 1994), Rickert (No. 94-187)). 
243 Id. 
244 Id. at 958 (citing Transcript of Violation of Probation Merits Hearing at 29-30 (Feb. 7, 
1994), Rickert (No. 94-187)). 
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On appeal, the defendant argued that the revocation of his 
probation was a violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination.249  The defendant felt that he was being penalized 
for denying facts and behaviors related to his charges to which he 
never admitted.250  The court found that the defendant failed to show 
how refusal to answer questions created a risk of incrimination.251  
Further, the court noted that the defendant was protected “against 
double jeopardy, [and] faces no threat of subsequent prosecution.”252  
The court, therefore, affirmed the trial court’s decision.253 
This case illustrates the conundrum faced by defendants re-
garding mandated programs and treatment confession.  Should the 
defendant choose to stay silent, he would be deemed noncompliant 
and would have to face consequences from the court.254  However, if 
a defendant agrees with the plea agreement or condition of bail and 
“confesses,” he risks incriminating himself in future proceedings, 
particularly if he has not been found guilty at the time of his partici-
pation in the program.255 
V. SOLUTIONS 
A. Stays in Concurrent Proceedings 
The structure of the IDV courts is innovative and efficient.256  
It provides a solution to the problem of fragmentation in domestic vi-
olence cases.257  However, it also creates a Fifth Amendment viola-
tion risk for the defendants.258  This comment proposes that IDV 
courts allow for the civil case to be stayed while the criminal case is 
pending. 
Stays have been used in cases where there were simultaneous 
 
249 Id. at 887, 888. 
250 Rickert, 665 A.2d at 888. 
251 Id. at 888-89. 
252 Id. at 889. 
253 Id. 
254 Angiolillo, IDV Court, supra note 88, at 153. 
255 Thomas L. Hafemeister, If All You Have is a Hammer: Society’s Ineffective Response 
to Intimate Partner Violence, 60 CATH. U.L. REV 919, 995-96 (2011). 
256 Angiolillo, IDV Court, supra note 88, at 151. 
257 Id. 
258 Julie A. Helling, Specialized Criminal Domestic Violence Courts, BATTERED WOMEN'S 
JUSTICE PROJECT 6 (1999), http://www.bwjp.org/assets/documents/pdfs/specialized_criminal 
_domestic_violence_courts.pdf. 
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proceedings to protect the defendant from having to make a difficult 
choice between asserting his Fifth Amendment right or testifying.259  
Federal courts have used the following six factors in deciding wheth-
er to grant a stay: 
(1) The extent to which the issues in the criminal case 
overlap with those presented in the civil case; (2) the 
status of the [criminal] case, including whether the de-
fendants have been indicted; (3) the private interests of 
the plaintiffs in proceeding expeditiously weighted 
against the prejudice to the plaintiffs caused by the de-
lay; (4) the private interests of and burden on the de-
fendants; (5) the interests of the courts; and (6) the 
public interest. 260 
Although the decision to grant a stay is dependent on the court and its 
evaluation of these factors, having this option would decrease the risk 
of putting a defendant in a difficult position of choosing between re-
maining silent and waiving his constitutional privilege.261  As seen in 
Havell, this was beneficial in protecting a defendant’s Fifth Amend-
ment right against self-incrimination.262  Despite this, it has been ar-
gued that staying the civil case in a parallel proceeding will cause 
significant delays.263  Nevertheless, the unique structure of IDV 
courts negates this argument. 
IDV courts handle all the cases of one family, including crim-
inal, matrimonial, and family.264  A study has found that it takes 
longer to reach a disposition in IDV courts than in traditional 
courts.265  In fact, family cases take the longest time to process com-
pared to the matrimonial or criminal cases.266  Since criminal cases in 
IDV courts generally reach a disposition quickly, staying the matri-
monial and family cases would not result to significant delays in 
court.  Furthermore, families in IDV courts generally continue to be 
 
259 Michael R. Holt, Parallel Proceedings in Florida’s State and Federal Courts – Fifth 
Amendment Considerations, 82 FLA. BAR J. 10 (2008) [hereinafter Holt, Parallel Proceed-
ings]. 
260 Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc., 676 F.3d 83, 99 (2d Cir. 2012). 
261 Holt, Parallel Proceedings, supra note 259, at 10. 
262 See discussion supra Section IV.A.1. 
263 David A. Hyman, When Courts Collide: Procedural Intersection and the Rule of Law, 
71 TUL. L. REV. 1389, 1449 (1997). 
264 Picard-Fritsche, Litigant Perspective, supra note 24, at 1. 
265 Cissner, Suffolk IDV, supra note 22, at 36. 
266 Cissner, Suffolk IDV, supra note 22, at 36. 
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involved with the court even after the conclusion of the criminal case 
because the defendant is monitored for a period of time post-
disposition.267  Therefore, the structure of IDV courts makes it a via-
ble setting in using civil stays. 
B. Therapeutic Immunity 
The premise behind problem-solving courts is to attempt to 
resolve societal problems by looking at the underlying issues that 
cause them.268  Domestic violence is a serious and complicated prob-
lem that must be addressed holistically, with the aim of rehabilitating 
the defendant.269  Domestic violence is not a victim or a women’s 
problem; it is a batterer’s issue.270  This means that in order to resolve 
the problem of domestic violence, the focus must be on the batter-
ers.271  IDV courts then must shift their focus and fully embrace being 
a problem-solving court, and focus on rehabilitating these defend-
ants.272  However, many, if not most, of these defendants would be 
adamant in not complying with treatment mandates or even taking the 
therapeutic process seriously if they believe that their statements 
might be used against them in a later proceeding.273  Thus, this com-
ment proposes that IDV courts use limited immunity with regard to 
therapeutic confessions. 
Therapeutic immunity is a way to encourage defendants to 
take Batterers Intervention Programs seriously.274  Instead of being 
preoccupied with whether their statements would be used against 
them, which leads to concealment of important therapeutic infor-
mation, defendants would be able to focus on working on their abu-
 
267 Cissner, Suffolk IDV, supra note 22, at 44. 
268 Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Justice and Problem Solving Courts, 30 FORDHAM 
URBAN L. J. 1055, 1060 (2002). 
269 Id. at 1057. 




272 Angiolillo, IDV Court, supra note 88, at 151. 
273 Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Justice and Problem Solving Courts, 30 FORDHAM 
URBAN L. J. 1055, 1067 (2002). 
274 Scott Michael Solkoff, Judicial Use Immunity and the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination in Court Mandated Therapy Programs, 17 NOVA. L. REV. 1441, 1485 (1993) 
[hereinafter Solkoff, Use Immunitiy]. 
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sive behaviors.275  Moreover, it would advance the goals of IDV 
courts in maintaining openness among and between the various par-
ties and agencies involved.276  Despite the benefits of therapeutic 
immunity, some courts have opposed its use.277 
It is argued that granting defendants therapeutic immunity 
would interfere with the prosecution of a criminal case.278  However, 
immunity does not mean that a defendant can never be prosecuted.279  
Giving defendants limited therapeutic immunity only means that 
prosecutors would not be able to use the defendant’s statements 
against him in a later proceeding.280  The prosecution could still use 
independently obtained information against the defendant.  There-
fore, therapeutic immunity not only protects the defendant’s Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, but it also functions 
as an effective therapeutic tool in the rehabilitation of these defend-
ants. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Society’s understanding of domestic violence has come a long 
way from being a private matter to becoming a public health matter.  
The goals of specialized courts, particularly IDV courts, which at-
tempt to tackle the complexity of domestic violence in a holistic 
manner, have served victims and society well.281  However, IDV 
courts seem to have overlooked the needs of one party in these cases, 
the defendants. 
Our constitution dictates that the Fifth Amendment protection 
against self-incrimination is a fundamental right.282  Nonetheless, the 
one family-one judge structure of IDV courts creates a situation 
 
275 Keith Guzik, The Agencies of Abuse: Intimate Abusers' Experience of Presumptive Ar-
rest and Prosecution, 42 L. & SOC. REV. 111, 129 (2008) [hereinafter Guzik, Agencies of 
Abuse]. 
276 Angiolillo, IDV Court, supra note 88, at 151. 
277 Solkoff, Use Immunity, supra note 274, at 1487-89. 
278 Solkoff, Use Immunity, supra note 274, at 1487-89. 
279 Solkoff, Use Immunity, supra note 274, at 1490. 
280 See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 411, 453 (1972) (stating “Transactional im-
munity, which affords full immunity from prosecution for the offense to which the com-
pelled testimony relates, affords the witness considerably broader protection that does the 
Fifth Amendment privilege”). 
281 Picard-Fritsche, Litigant Perspective, supra note 24, at 20-22. 
282 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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where this fundamental right will likely be violated.283  Specifically, 
integrating the criminal, family and matrimonial cases in one court 
and hearing these cases in one day creates a risk that the defendant’s 
privilege against self-incrimination will be violated.284  A defendant’s 
statements in these proceedings are testimonial.285  Moreover, be-
cause of the heightened judicial oversight, his statements are likely to 
be coerced and incriminating.286  To reduce the risk that a defendant’s 
statements in his family or matrimonial case will be used against him 
in his criminal case, it is suggested that the civil case be stayed until 
the resolution of the criminal case.287 
Furthermore, therapeutic confessions upon admission and par-
ticipation in Batterers Intervention Programs likely violate the de-
fendant’s constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.288  Con-
struing batterers programs as a mere form of another punishment 
does not promote the goal of IDV court or problem-solving courts as 
a whole.289  It is important that rehabilitation of these defendants be-
comes a priority in the fight against domestic violence.  To achieve 
defendant accountability, which is one of the primary goals of IDV 
courts,290 it is suggested that IDV courts use limited immunity for 
these defendants.  In this way, limited immunity lessens the defend-
ants’ concern that their statements during therapy can and may be 
used against them in a later proceeding.291  It then allows the defend-
ants to take the program seriously, thereby increasing the chance of 
rehabilitation.292  It is important to remember that the constitution af-
fords protection to each and every individual, including domestic bat-




283 Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 92. 
284 Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 92. 
285 See discussion supra Section IV.A.2 
286 Id. 
287 See discussion supra Section V.A. 
288 Berg, Liberty or Silence, supra note 118, at 702. 
289 See Bongiovanni, 701 N.Y.S.2d at 614 (stating that treatment programs serves as a re-
minder to the defendant that the court “can rescind his liberty on his failure to abide by [pro-
gram mandate] dictates”). 
290 Cissner, Testing Effects, supra note 179. 
291 See discussion supra Section V.B. 
292 Guzik, Agencies of Abuse, supra note 275. 
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